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  Abstract 
 
  The Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) System is a very large, but relatively unknown, 
cooperatively owned  government sponsored enterprise (GSE) that is charged with assisting its 
owner/members to finance housing and some community lending.  After an introductory overview 
of the FHLB System, this chapter summarizes the 77-year history of the System, including the 
evolution of this institution’s structure, public mission, and activities.  Building on this background, 
we then conduct an evaluation of the public policy question of the expansion of the FHLBs’ 
authorization to issue standby letters of credit.  We further examine the role, actions, and stresses of 
the FHLB System in the context of the current financial crisis, as well as outlining some 
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  I. Introduction 
  Substantial analytical and political attention has been paid this decade to two large 
"government sponsored enterprises" (GSEs) -- Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac -- that are at the center 
of the U.S. secondary residential mortgage market.  Frequently overlooked is another large GSE -- 
the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) System -- that is also involved in residential mortgage 
finance, albeit in a different way.
1  Indeed, by one standard measure of size -- the balance sheet 
assets of the organizations -- the FHLB System is now the largest of the three housing GSEs.
2
  The FHLB System is composed of 12 cooperatively owned wholesale Federal Home Loan 
Banks (FHLBs) and an Office of Finance that acts as the FHLBs’ gateway to the capital markets.  
Each FHLB is a separate legal entity and has its own management, employees, board of directors, 
and financial statements.  Each FHLB is cooperatively owned by its member commercial banks, 
thrifts, credit unions and insurance companies headquartered within the distinct geographic area that 
the FHLB has been assigned to serve.  Members must either maintain at least 10 percent of their 
asset portfolios in mortgage-related assets or be designated as “community financial institutions”.  
Altogether, the FHLB System currently has over 8,000 financial institutions members. 
 
  In Table 1 we show the relative sizes (in terms of total assets) and numbers of members for 
each of the 12 FHLBs as of December 31, 2008.  The FHLB of San Francisco is by far the largest 
institution ($321 billion), accounting for almost a quarter of the FHLB System's assets.  The FHLBs 
of Des Moines and Atlanta each have about 15% of the total FHLB System membership.  Table 1 
                                                           
     
1 Flannery and Frame (2006), on which this essay draws heavily, characterize the FHLB System as the 
"other" housing GSE.  They could find only seven academic articles concerning the operation of the FHLB 
System itself in an EconLit search.  For an older effort to find discussions and descriptions of the FHLB 
System, see White (1991, p. 65, n. 1). 
     
2 As of year-end 2008, the FHLB System had total assets of $1,349 billion; Fannie Mae had assets of $912 
billion; and Freddie Mac had assets of $851 billion.  What this comparison neglects, however, is the large 
amounts of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) issued by the latter two GSEs.  As of year-end 2008, Fannie 
Mae had $2,289 billion in net MBS outstanding (i.e., net of those MBS held on their own balance sheet), 
while Freddie Mac had $1,403 billion in net MBS outstanding.  
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also shows the extent to which each bank's business is dominated by its largest members.  The 
percentage of each bank's capital that is accounted for by its five largest members ranges from 30% 
(the FHLB of Chicago) to 73% (the FHLB of San Francisco); the weighted average for the entire 
System is 53%.  Similarly, the percentage of each bank's advances that is accounted for by its five 
largest users range from 40% (the FHLBs of Chicago and of Des Moines) to 78% (the FHLB of San 
Francisco), and the System's weighted average is 59%. 
  The FHLB System is often viewed as a whole because most FHLB financing takes the form 
of consolidated obligations for which the 12 institutions are jointly and severally liable.  The 
statutory mission of this GSE is to provide their owner/members with financial products and 
services to assist and enhance their members’ financing of (a) housing and (b) community 
lending.
3  Table 2 shows the consolidated balance sheet of the 12 FHLBs, as of December 31, 2008.  
As can be seen, collateralized loans (advances) constitute almost 69% of the FHLB System's assets, 
and residential mortgages and mortgage-backed securities account for 19% of assets.  On the 
liabilities side of the balance sheet, the consolidated obligations, which are bonds floated in 
international capital markets, constitute over 93% of total liabilities and capital (and thus also of 
total assets).  The FHLB System's capital is only 3.8% of assets, and almost all of that is the 
members' contributed capital; retained earnings are only 0.2% of assets (and 5.6% of capital).
4
                                                           
     
3 See Federal Home Loan Bank Mission, 12 C.F.R. § 940 (2006), and “Mission of the Banks,” 65 Fed. 
Reg. 25, 278 (May 1, 2000).  Other FHLB activities include (a) acquiring member assets (e.g., 
mortgages), (b) standby letters of credit, (c) intermediary derivative contracts, and (d) debt or equity 
investments (that primarily benefit households below 80 percent of area median income).   
  The 
FHLB System is thus highly leveraged. 
 
     
4 By contrast, in 1986, retained earnings were 1.7% of assets and 9.2% of capital.  There is a ready 
explanation for this relative reduction in retained earnings:  The FHLB System had significant amounts of its 
retained earnings grabbed by the Congress in 1987 and 1989.  Though the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 
(GLBA) made clearer that the FHLB System's retained earnings were owned by its members, the FHLB 
System's members remain distrustful (and, of course, the Congress could pass new legislation that could 
reverse the GLBA assurances).  
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  Member advances are historically the primary activity conducted by the FHLBs.  These 
loans are generally collateralized by residential mortgage-related assets (whole loans and 
mortgage-backed securities) and U.S. Treasury and Federal Agency securities.
5  Beyond the 
explicit collateral, the FHLBs also have priority over the claims of depositors and almost all 
other creditors (including the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) in the event of a member’s 
default; this is often described as a “super-lien.”
6
  The FHLB System is considered to be a GSE because, like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 
it was expressly created by an Act of Congress (the Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932) that 
includes limits on permissible activities as well as several institutional benefits.  As noted 
previously, the FHLBs are, in principle, statutorily limited to assisting their members in 
residential mortgage funding and some community lending, although in practice their activities 
may be supporting a wide-variety of economic sectors.  The FHLBs also designate at least 10 
percent of their net earnings for low-  and moderate-income housing programs and are also 
responsible for paying interest on the $30 billion in REFCORP bonds that were issued from 1989 
through 1991 to help fund the resolution of the savings-and-loan crisis.   
  Taken together, these features help to explain 
why none of the FHLBs has ever suffered a loss on an advance.   
  Special privileges accruing to the FHLB System include: a provision authorizing the 
Treasury Secretary to purchase up to $4 billion of FHLB securities; the treatment of FHLB 
securities as “government securities” under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and an 
exemption from the bankruptcy code by way of being considered “federal instrumentalities”.  These 
and other provisions, combined with past government actions, have created a perception in financial 
                                                           
     
5 See 12 U.S.C. 1430(a)(3) for a complete list of eligible collateral.  Federal Agency securities are 
generally synonymous with debt and mortgage-backed securities issued by government sponsored 
enterprises. 
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markets that FHLB obligations (like those of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) are implicitly 
guaranteed by the federal government.  This, in turn, allows the FHLB System consistently to 
finance their activities by issuing debt on favorable terms (better than AAA corporate rates, but not 
quite as good as U.S. Treasury rates).
7  The FHLBs pass most of that advantage through to their 
members in the form of lower interest rates on advances, and the remainder (after the System's 
expenses are covered) to members in the form of dividends (consistent with the FHLBs' cooperative 
structure).
8
  The purpose of the FHLB funding advantage is to encourage their members' financing of 
housing and some community development.  While members must post collateral to secure their 
advances and that collateral is typically residential mortgage-related (whole loans or mortgage-
backed securities), money is fungible; there is no reason why the members would necessarily use 
the borrowed funds for further housing loans or other designated uses.  Indeed, Frame, Hancock, 
and Passmore (2007) find that FHLB advances are just as likely to fund other types of bank credit as 
to fund residential mortgages. 
 
  Recognizing the special GSE status of the FHLB System and the potential risk to taxpayers, 
the federal government regulates the FHLB System for "safety and soundness" and for "mission" 
purposes through the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA).  The FHFA was created in 2008 
through the consolidation of the FHLB System’s former regulator (the Federal Housing Finance 
Board) with the former regulator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the Office of Federal Housing 
Enterprise Oversight).     
                                                           
     
7 For example, looking at average funding spreads between 1995 and 1999 period, Ambrose and Warga 
(2002) estimate that FHLB long-term debt securities trade at 44 basis points below comparable fully private 
firms.  Overall, on a weighted-average basis, housing GSE funding advantages have been estimated at about 
35-40 basis points.  Other things being equal, the joint and several liability provision for FHLB System 
obligations would tend to increase this funding advantage for the FHLB System relative to Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac. 
 
     
8 And, again, the FHLBs are reluctant to retain earnings, given their past experience with the Congress.  
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  The remainder of this chapter will describe the 75-year evolution of the FHLB System, with 
special attention being paid to the various issues that this GSE faces.  We will then provide some 
analysis of the recent expansion of FHLB authorities to issue standby letters of credit (SLOCs).  
Finally, we discuss the role, actions, and stresses of the FHLB System during the current financial 
crisis.  
 
  II. Some History 
A. The early years. 
  Like a number of other features of America's housing finance sector, the FHLB System has 
its origins in the 1930s.
9
  As is still true today, FHLB member/owners were required to buy stock in their regional 
FHLB, and this provided the GSE with some of its equity/capital.  The FHLBs then leveraged these 
funds by borrowing in the capital markets at favorable rates and relending these funds at favorable 
rates to their members (via advances).  In addition to posting collateral for an advance, members 
  In 1932, the FHLB System was created by statute, with the goal of helping 
provide a stable source of long-term funding for residential mortgage lending.  Their core business 
was lending (via advances) to their member/owners, which were almost exclusively thrift 
institutions located in the FHLBs’ geographic service districts.  (Some life insurance companies, 
which at the time were significant funders of residential mortgages, were also members.)  Until the 
1990s, all federally chartered thrifts and state-chartered thrifts that were insured by the FSLIC were 
required to join the FHLB System; state-chartered thrifts (which included mutual savings banks) 
that were insured by the FDIC or by state insurance funds had the option of joining.   
                                                           
     
9 Other important government innovations of the 1930s include: (a) the federal regulatory regime for the 
housing-oriented thrift industry in 1933 and 1934; (b) federal deposit insurance -- the Federal Savings and 
Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) --  for thrifts in 1934; (c) the creation of the Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA) in 1934 (and from the FHA, the development of the 30-year fixed-rate mortgage); and 
(d) the creation of the predecessor organization to Fannie Mae in 1938.  
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were expected to subscribe for additional FHLB capital as a percentage of the size of the advance 
(e.g., 5% of the amount of an advance).
10
  The original FHLBs were headquartered in 12 cities that were specifically not the cities in 
which the 12 regional Federal Reserve Banks were headquartered.
 
11
The FHLB System grew slowly from the 1930s through the 1950s, as can be seen in Table 
3.  And as of 1960, the FHLBs' advances to their members were equal to less than 3% of the assets 
of their members.  During the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, however, thrifts increasingly saw the 
FHLBs' advances as an alternative source of low-cost liquidity.  By 1980, advances were about 8% 
of members’ assets.  The increased importance of FHLB advances was perhaps due to limitations 
on the interest rates that thrifts (and other depository institutions) could pay depositors under 
Regulation Q.  Hence, FHLB advances to thrifts acted as a reliable source of mortgage funding 
during deposit shortages. 
  The overseer of the FHLB 
System was the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (Bank Board), which acquired additional powers 
as the federal charterer and safety-and-soundness regulator of the savings and loan (S&L) industry 
in 1933 and as the deposit insurer through the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation 
(FSLIC) in 1934. 
 
B. The 1980s. 
  Despite the termination of the Regulation Q ceiling on savings account interest rates in 
                                                           
     
10 This capital subscription requirement can be considered to be similar to “compensating balances”, 
which banks as lenders often required from borrowers.  See Flannery and Frame (2006) for a discussion 
of other activity-based capital requirements by the FHLBs. 
 
     
11  The original 12 cities of the FHLB System were: Cambridge, MA; Newark, NJ; Pittsburgh, PA; 
Winston-Salem, NC; Cincinnati, OH; Indianapolis, IN; Evanston, IL; Little Rock, AR; Topeka, KS; Des 
Moines, IA; Los Angeles, CA; and Portland, OR.  Today the banks' headquarters are in Boston, New York, 
Pittsburgh, Atlanta, Cincinnati, Indianapolis, Chicago, Dallas, Topeka, Des Moines, San Francisco, and 
Seattle, and thus they overlap with Federal Reserve regional banks in six cities.  
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1980 and 1982 (by the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act, and the 
Garn-St Germain Act, respectively), the early 1980s saw a significant expansion of the FHLBs.  
Between 1980 and 1985, FHLB System total assets doubled (from $54 billion to $112 billion) – 
even while membership slid by almost 20%.  This occurred because FHLB advances became an 
important tool for helping thrifts improve their asset-liability positions,  since it was widely 
recognized that the thrifts' maturity-mismatched balance sheets -- long-term (30-year fixed-rate) 
residential mortgage assets and short-term deposit liabilities -- had been the cause of the initial thrift 
crisis when interest rates spiked in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
12
  There was an additional important change for the System in the mid-1980s.  From the 
beginning of the Bank Board's chartering and safety-and-soundness regulatory authority over the 
thrift industry in the 1930s, the FHLBs had played a role in that regulation.  Though the examiners 
were on the payroll of the Bank Board and thus were federal government civil servants, the 
supervisors were employees of the FHLBs and outside the civil service (and the president of each 
FHLB also had the title of "Principal Supervisory Agent").  When the leadership of the Bank Board 
decided in 1984-85 that expanded regulatory personnel were needed to deal with the growing 
safety-and-soundness crisis of the S&L industry, it turned to the FHLB System.  In July 1985 the 
agency's examiners were transferred to the FHLBs, where their numbers and pay scales could be 
expanded without the restrictions of civil service salaries and federal staffing limits.   
   
 
C. 1989 and afterward. 
  The next major change to the FHLB System occurred in August 1989, with the passage of 
the Financial Institutions Recovery and Reform Act (FIRREA).  This law represented the 
Congress's belated effort to deal with the necessity of resolving the insolvency of the thrifts' deposit 
                                                           
     
12 See White (1991) for further discussion.  
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insurance fund, the FSLIC.  In addition to allocating $50 billion to that resolution (which turned out 
to be only a down payment on an estimated $150 billion total resolution cost), the law abolished the 
Bank Board and divided its responsibilities in four directions:  Thrift regulation was the 
responsibility of a newly created agency, the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), and the FHLB 
System’s role in the regulation of the thrift industry ceased.  The FSLIC's deposit insurance function 
was absorbed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).  The cleanup and disposal of 
hundreds of insolvent thrifts became the responsibility of another newly created agency, the 
Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), which was primarily staffed and led by personnel from the 
FDIC.  And the regulation and oversight of the FHLB System was lodged in yet another newly 
created agency, the Federal Housing Finance Board (FHFB).
13
  A new regulator was not the only change for the FHLB System that was contained in the 
FIRREA.  First, the Congress was eager to have the thrift industry bear part of the burden of the 
cleanup costs.  Since the FHLB System was owned by the thrift industry, taking some of the 
System’s net worth and levying a tax on its future profits would be a way of putting part of the 
burden on the thrifts.
 
14
                                                           
     
13 As noted previously, in July 2008 the FHFB and the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight 
(OFHEO) were combined into a new agency, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). 
  The FIRREA required that $2.8 billion of the System's net worth be used to 
defease the principal on the $30 billion in 40-year REFCORP bonds that were floated to help pay 
for the cleanup and also required that $300 million per year from the FHLBs' annual earnings be 
devoted to paying part of the interest on those bonds.  Additionally, the FHLBs were required to 
support low- and moderate-income housing programs with $50 million per year through 1993, $75 
 
     
14 Two years earlier, when the Congress had expanded the FSLIC's borrowing capacity in the Competitive 
Equality Banking Act (CEBA) of 1987, it also required that up to $3 billion of the FHLB System's net worth 
be used to defease the principal on the 30-year bonds that were floated by the Financing Corporation (FICO) 
on behalf of the FSLIC; in fact, only $700 million was required at the time.  However, the remainder, plus an 
additional sum, was used subsequently to defease the principal on the 40-year REFCORP bonds that were 
part of the FIRREA clean-up.  
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million in 1994, and $100 million per year thereafter.  In 1999, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
(GLBA) altered these “income taxes” to 20% and 10% of the FHLB System's profits, respectively.  
  Second, to ease the burden on the FHLBs themselves, the legislation also opened voluntary 
membership in the FHLBs to other federally insured depository institutions -- commercial banks 
and credit unions -- that had 10% or more of their assets devoted to residential mortgage finance.
15
  The statutory changes in FIRREA encouraged the FHLB System to grow and to increase 
its attention to profitability.  Between 1989 and 2008, FHLB System total assets increased from 
about $175 billion to $1,349 trillion, and its composition of assets changed.  Besides a secular 
increase in  advances, FHLB balance sheets also came to include substantial investment in 
marketable securities (especially residential mortgage-backed securities) and member-guaranteed 
mortgage pools.  This shift, in turn, resulted in the FHLBs’ managing an increasing amount of 
interest rate risk, including the embedded call options associated with the prepayment of 
residential mortgages.  Concomitantly, the System's leverage increased and percentage capital 
levels fell, from 8.9% of assets in 1988 to 3.8% of assets in 2008.  
  
The GLBA further opened potential FHLB membership by allowing “community financial 
institutions” (i.e., those with under $500 million in total assets as of 1999, and subsequently 
indexed) to join irrespective of their holdings of residential mortgage-related assets. 
  Each FHLB maintains an investment portfolio of shorter-term instruments for liquidity and 
longer-term securities for income.  Pre-FIRREA, in 1988, FHLB System total investments were 
$35.2 billion (19.5% of total assets); this quickly jumped to $71.7 billion (46.4% of total assets) in 
three years time (year-end 1991).  Much of this initial increase in investment holdings was in 
mortgage-backed securities issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  Concerns about interest-rate 
                                                           
     
15 Federally chartered thrifts were still required to be FHLB members until 1999, when the GLBA allowed 
their membership too to become voluntary; as a consequence of regulations adopted by the Office of Thrift 
Supervision, federally insured state-chartered thrifts became voluntary members in 1995.  
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risk, coupled with political criticism, led the FHFB subsequently to revise its “Financial 
Management Policy” in 1992 so as to limit FHLB holdings of mortgage-backed securities to 300% 
of total equity.
16
  In the late 1990s, the FHLBs began purchasing mortgages from their members through 
either the “mortgage partnership finance program” operated by the Chicago FHLB or other 
“mortgage purchase” programs operated by some of the other individual FHLBs.  While there are 
some differences between these programs, the fundamental risk-sharing principles are the same:  
The selling member guarantees most of the credit risk on the mortgages, while the FHLBs bear the 
attendant interest rate risks.
 
17
  Internal competitive pressures have also increasingly been felt by the individual FHLBs 
due to the introduction of voluntary membership and to financial services consolidation.  The 
commercial banks, thrifts, and credit unions chartered in a FHLB’s geographic territory will join 
only if they receive valuable services.  In addition, as a consequence of mergers and acquisitions 
some financial institutions have retained charters in multiple FHLB districts, which allow them 
to borrow from the individual FHLB offering the cheapest advances.  This competition places 
downward pressure on the interest rates on advances (while the non-borrowing or light-borrowing 
members of the FHLB System would prefer higher interest rates on advances and thus higher profits 
  While these mortgage purchases are economically the same as 
investing in mortgage-backed securities, the FHFB approved this activity on the basis that it was 
consistent with the FHLB System’s mission and benefited members.  The FHLBs' mortgage 
holdings  peaked at $114 billion in 2004 and have slowly, but steadily, declined since  then, 
following some financial and accounting difficulties related to these programs.  At year-end 2008 
they amounted to $87 billion. 
                                                           
    
16 In March 2008, the FHFB temporarily increased this limit to 600%. 
 
     
17 More detailed descriptions and further discussions of the FHLB mortgage programs can be found in 
Frame (2003) and Frame and White (2007).  
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and dividends).
18
  Earlier in this decade several of the individual FHLBs and certain housing industry 
groups (e.g., the Mortgage Bankers Association of America) proposed allowing the FHLB 
System to securitize conforming mortgages.
 
19  The policy motivation for this proposal was 
grounded in the perception that the guarantee fees charged by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in 
conjunction with the issuance of mortgage-backed securities (at the time, around 20 basis points 
on a weighted average basis) appeared to be excessive.  While a formal proposal including the 
proposed structure and scope of FHLB securitization activity has not yet been put forward, one 
may speculate that it would involve the issuance of single-class securities with a blanket FHLB 
System guarantee and be operated through the Office of Finance.
20  This would be akin to the 
FHLB System’s being authorized to enter the mortgage credit guarantee business on an equal 
footing with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
21
  The entry of the FHLBs into providing standby letters of credit (SLOCs) is yet another 
area of controversy -- an issue that we address below in Section III. 
  
   
                                                           
     
18  See U.S. General Accounting Office (2003) for a discussion of competition within the FHLB 
System, including the role of the price and non-price terms of credit.  
 
    
19 Conforming mortgages are those that conform to the size and quality standards that would allow 
them to be bought or securitized by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. 
 
     
20 The Chicago FHLB has already participated in some securitization activity through their “shared 
funding program”, which allows the institution to acquire collateralized mortgage obligations and sell 
interests in such assets (to other FHLBs or to FHLB System members).  The inaugural deals involved the 
Chicago FHLB working with certain members to structure securities backed by conventional-conforming 
mortgages, using a REMIC structure.  Given that no new “shared funding program” deals have recently 
occurred, one may speculate that the structure has been found to be uneconomical.   
 
    
21 Following the imposition of conservatorship regimes at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in 2008, there 
has also been policy discussion about converting these GSEs from stock to cooperative ownership.  This 
could also naturally lead to a discussion of whether simply to abolish Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and 
hand over responsibility for government-sponsored securitization to the FHLB System.  
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III. Public Policy and the FHLB System 
A. The overriding issue. 
  As is true for the two other housing GSEs (i.e., Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac), a 
fundamental public policy issue for the FHLB System should be immediately addressed:  Since the 
U.S. today has well-developed financial markets (including mortgage markets) and there are also 
extensive tax advantages and other preferential policies for residential housing already in place, 
what legitimate purpose is currently served by the housing GSEs?
22
  As a related matter, when a GSE enters a new activity, the presence of their underlying 
borrowing advantage makes it difficult to discern whether their expansion (if successful) is due to 
an inherent efficiency or synergy or whether it is simply a "leveraging" of their borrowing 
advantage to the new activity.  This issue is particularly troublesome when private firms are already 
serving the market that the GSE is entering.  Moreover, if the new activity should prove to be a 
major problem for the GSE, could the adverse financial consequences be large enough to place 
taxpayers at risk?  Note that the perceived implied guarantee provides  excessive risk-taking 
incentives to GSE shareholders and allows these institutions to grow almost without limit since their 
debt funding costs are seemingly invariant to risk.  Such concerns about moral hazard and the 
  Where are the market failures 
that housing GSEs are supposed to correct?  This question takes special importance for the FHLB 
System since, as was mentioned above, it appears that the FHLBs' advances to their members are 
used for general lending purposes, rather than being particularly focused on housing finance.  
Further, it is clear that the larger FHLB members that are the largest users of advances are well able 
to access national capital markets on their own and do not need the FHLBs as intermediaries on 
their behalf.  While smaller members might benefit from a FHLB-like wholesale funding 
intermediary, it is not clear that such an institution needs a Congressional charter.  
                                                           
     
22 This question has also been posed specifically for the activities of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac by 
White (2003, 2004) and Frame and White (2005).  
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potential scale of taxpayer liability have been primarily discussed in the context of Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac – and these fears were ultimately realized.
23
  With respect to the FHLB System and as discussed in Flannery and Frame (2006), the 
cooperative ownership structure does not mitigate the dangers of deliberate or inadvertent risk-
taking by the FHLBs.  The extremely high leverage of the FHLB System (a ratio of assets to capital 
of over twenty-to-one) and the fact that the debt is held by outsiders who are lulled into slack 
monitoring (and the acceptance of that high leverage) because of the System’s GSE status mean that 
FHLB member/owners can still gain (in an expected value sense) from risk-taking.  Similarly, the 
joint-and-several-liability structure of their consolidated obligations  serves as only a modest 
restraint on risk-taking.  Though the 11 other FHLBs may be liable for the misdeeds or errors of any 
single FHLB, a free rider problem among those 11 could well mute their efforts to control risk-
taking among the 12.  Indeed, just prior to the financial crisis, financial difficulties arose at some of 
the FHLBs (e.g., Chicago and Seattle) because of difficulties in managing and accounting for the 
interest rate risk associated with their respective mortgage purchase programs (discussed above).  
During the crisis, several FHLBs have experienced material write-downs due to their holdings of 
the supposedly safe, high-rated tranches of privately issued mortgage-backed securities.   
     
  As mentioned previously, the federal government regulates the safety-and-soundness of the 
FHLB System, so as to protect the System's creditors and (perhaps) the federal government, in the 
event that the System experienced financial difficulties.  However, as Frame and White (2004) point 
out, the presence of a safety-and-soundness regulator, somewhat ironically, may well strengthen the 
capital market’s perception that the federal government will bail out the System and thereby 
strengthen the political pressures for such a bailout in the event of financial difficulties.  As a matter 
of a priori reasoning, then, it is unclear whether the presence of a safety-and-soundness regulator (or 
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the prominent strengthening of such a regulator) lowers or raises the expected costs to taxpayers.
24
  In any event, the safety-and-soundness issue re-raises the question of what are the public 
purpose benefits of the FHLB System and whether those benefits are worth the risks.  Now, we turn 
to a specific FHLB issue: standby letters of credit. 
 
 
B. Standby Letters of Credit. 
  Standby letters of credit (SLOCs) are, in essence, a guarantee (or insurance) issued by a 
third party to a lending transaction that states that, in the event that a borrower fails to honor its 
repayment obligation to the lender, the SLOC issuer will fulfill that obligation.
25  Put differently, in 
the event of borrower default, the SLOC issuer agrees to make regular principal and interest 
payment to the lender and then will establish a claim on the original borrower for these funds.  (The 
same principle applies if there is yet an additional party that is providing a back-up SLOC to support 
the original issuer of a SLOC.)  The borrower pays a fee to the issuer in exchange for the SLOC, but 
as a result is able to obtain better terms (e.g., a lower interest rate) on its borrowing since the lender 
is able to look to the issuer for the back-up protection.  Though there is always some advantage to 
the lender in being able to look to an additional party for back-up protection,
26
                                                           
     
24 In addition, the actions of the U.S. Treasury in 2008-2009 to support Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
has likely further strengthened the FHLBs’ creditors’ beliefs that the Treasury would likely come to the 
rescue of the FHLB System if it experienced financial difficulties. 
 the advantage is 
especially salient when the financial strength of the guarantor (e.g., as measured by an external 
credit rater, such as Moody's or Standard & Poor's) is greater than the financial strength of the 
borrower.   
 
     
25 Other, familiar forms of this kind of back-up arrangement are the practices of having a co-signer on a 
loan, having mortgage insurance, and having credit card insurance.  Another way of phrasing this activity is 
that it is a "credit enhancement". 
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  The FHLBs first received authority to issue SLOCs in 1983 because these instruments were 
considered to be the functional equivalent of an advance.  In November 1998, the FHFB codified 
existing regulatory guidance related to FHLB issuance of SLOCs in Part 938 of its rules and 
regulations.
27
  As of year-end 2007, the 12 FHLBs together had almost $29 billion in SLOCs outstanding – 
backing taxable bonds, tax-exempt housing bonds, and public unit deposits.  Nevertheless, the 
FHLBs' issuances of SLOCs had been limited by the fact that existing law required that municipal 
bonds (the interest for which is typically income-tax-exempt) would lose their income-tax-exempt 
status if they were guaranteed or insured by the federal government or its agencies, which for these 
purposes appeared to include the FHLBs.  But the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), the 
Veteran’s Administration (VA), Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae were each already 
exempt from this law.
  The final rule expanded the FHLBs' authorization to offer SLOCs to members and 
eligible non-member mortgagees for any of four general purposes:  (1) to assist members in 
facilitating residential housing finance; (2) to assist members in facilitating community lending; (3) 
to assist members with asset/liability management; and (4) to assist members with liquidity and 
other funding.  SLOCs issued to members must be fully collateralized using either eligible advance 
collateral (outlined in 12 C.F.R. 950.7) or, when related to (1) or (2), investment grade municipal 
bonds.  SLOCs issued to eligible nonmember mortgagees (housing associates) generally must be 
collateralized by FHA-insured mortgages (or securities backed exclusively by such loans), although 
the broader range of advance collateral may be pledged in the event that the SLOC is for purpose 
(2). 
28
                                                           
     
27 During the notice and comment period for proposed Part 938, the U.S. Treasury Department 
raised objections – most notably that the new rule gave the FHLBs too much latitude for issuing 
SLOCs.  See Carnell (1998).   
  Legislation had been periodically been considered by the Congress that 
would have allowed municipal bonds to retain their tax-exempt status even when they received 
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SLOCs directly from the FHLBs or indirectly from FHLB members that had back-up SLOCs from 
the FHLBs.  Not surprisingly, the private-sector monoline bond guarantors opposed the proposed 
legislation (as they did the 1998 expanded authorization).
29
  In mid-2008, as part of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, the FHLBs 
gained their exemption as well.  By the end of 2008, the FHLBs’ outstanding SLOCs had expanded 
to almost $50 billion. 
 
  The FHLBs’ expansion of their SLOC activities poses the kinds of questions that we raised 
in Section A above:  Is the FHLBs' expansion here part of an inherent efficiency or synergy?  Or is 
it just a leveraging of their special GSE borrowing advantage into an already competitive market?  
As a related point, how well does the offering of SLOCs fit with the FHLBs' current expertise?  
Does it raise safety-and-soundness concerns?   
  On this last question, under FHFB regulations, it appears that a SLOC issued by a FHLB to 
credit enhance municipal obligations would have to be intermediated by an FHLB member.   
Further, in the event that the municipal borrower (covered by the SLOC) defaults, the original issuer 
of the SLOC (the FHLB member) would be expected to make the principal and interest payments to 
the lender/beneficiary and then would acquire the lender’s claim on the borrower (and would try to 
collect).  Only if the FHLB member also defaulted on its obligation would the FHLB be liable for 
the obligation; but the FHLB would have the collateral that had been posted by the member as part 
of the terms of the SLOC, as well as a “super-lien” on the assets of the member for the repayment of 
advances, including advances that are created by a SLOC-related member default. At this level, the 
safety aspects of the SLOCs to the FHLBs appear to be quite small.
30
                                                           
     
29 See Stern and Cochrane (1998) and McCarthy (2006). 
  However, unlike the capital 
requirements for advances, only a few FHLBs require an additional activity stock purchase 
     
30 In essence, because of the FHLB’s collateral requirement and super-lien, any loss created by a 
SLOC-related member default would be absorbed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).  
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requirement on their members for obtaining SLOCs.  This suggests that a large increase in SLOC 
activity (with no attendant increase in capital) could increase FHLB risk profiles.  
  In any event, the first of our questions remains:  Is there a market failure in the area of bond 
guarantees that would justify the FHLBs’ expanded SLOC authority?  It seems unlikely that the 
market for third-party credit enhancements for municipalities is inefficient or underserved.  We are 
unaware of any barriers to entry.  And, at the same time, the FHLBs may have two important GSE-
related advantages that could help them under-price private-sector SLOC competitors:  The first is 
that the FHLB System, like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, maintains a AAA rating despite holding 
much less equity/capital than similarly rated private financial firms.  The second is the previously 
mentioned ability of the FHLB to lay to claim to marketable collateral as well having as a “super-
lien” for the repayment of advances, which include those advances created by a SLOC. 
  The SLOC debate thus represented an interesting question as to the extent to which public 
policy should encourage the leveraging of the FHLBs’ GSE advantage into areas that are 
increasingly distant from the original housing mission of the System.  We expect that this will not 
be the last time that the issue of the FHLBs’ expansion will be debated. 
 
C. The FHLB System during the Recent Financial Crisis. 
  At the outset of the recent financial crisis, the FHLB System played an important role in 
providing liquidity – via advances – to its members.  According to Ashcraft, Bech, and Frame 
(2008), FHLB advances increased by $235 billion during the second half of 2007 (to $875 billion); 
with advances to 10 members accounting for $150 billion of this increase.  The authors point out 
that during this time the FHLBs provided cheaper and more flexible financing than the Federal 
Reserve, which is typically viewed as the lender-of-last-resort.  
  During 2008, however, FHLB advance lending began to taper off, owing to several factors:  
First, as the financial crisis evolved, the Federal Reserve System became more creative and  
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aggressive in their lending practices.  Second, the imposition of a federal conservatorship regime at 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac led these issuers of federal agency debt to get more favorable pricing 
for their bonds – despite their financial distress.  Higher interest rates on FHLB debt, ceteris paribus, 
led to higher advance rates and some decline in activity.  Finally, the FDIC’s creation of the Term 
Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLGP) provided an attractive alternative for depository institutions to 
access low-cost capital market financing.
31
  However, as was mentioned above, the FHLBs themselves have been financially weakened 
during the crisis – partly from unfortunate investments in some of the “toxic assets” that were the 
result of the subprime mortgage securitizations of recent years, and partly from the continuing 
fallout from their inability to manage the interest rate risk from their “mortgage purchase” programs 
with FHLB members. 
 
  Thus, the appropriate role for the FHLBs once the crisis has passed remains an open but 
interesting and important question – as is true for the other two housing GSEs (Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac). 
 
D. Whither the FHLB System? 
  The FHLB System has largely stayed “under the radar” in the policy discussions of post-
crisis  regulatory reform.  Although the system has experienced some financial stress, it  has 
remained solvent and has not required the kinds of governmental interventions that the insolvencies 
of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac required: government conservatorships, and substantial injections 
of government funds.  Also, as we noted at the beginning of this chapter, the FHLB System was and 
remains far less well known than its two GSE “colleagues”. 
  Nevertheless, as the Obama Administration’s “Financial Regulatory Reform” proposals 
                                                           
     
31 We note that preliminary data for the third quarter of 2009 show this shrinkage continuing, with the 
FHLB System’s aggregate assets shrinking to $1,062 billion (from $1,349 billion at year-end 2008) and 
advances shrinking to $678 billion (from $929 billion).  
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acknowledged,
32
  As we indicated earlier, the heart of any discussion about the future for the FHLB System 
should be the consideration of potential market failures.  Without the identification of market 
failures, the justification for governmental action – or, in the case of the GSEs, semi-governmental 
action – is greatly eroded, unless favorable income redistribution enters the picture (e.g., efforts by 
society to help lower-income households).  We are unaware of any significant income redistribution 
arguments that apply to the FHLB System; and, as argued above, we don’t see the FHLB System’s 
functions – lending directly to its members, and assisting its members in their lending activities -- as 
compensating for significant market failures.  That the beneficiaries of these activities receive a 
subsidy (derived ultimately from the System’s GSE-based favorable borrowing rates) is clear, as is 
their desire to continue to receive the subsidy; but absent a strong market failure or redistribution 
argument, the subsidy is a likely source of distortion and mis-allocation of resources, rather than a 
positive social feature. 
 the needed long-run (i.e., post-crisis) reforms and restructuring of the U.S. housing 
finance system should encompass the FHLB System as well as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 
  Further, the System’s GSE status introduces an extra set of issues:  The implicit (or, post 
2008, increasingly explicit) guaranty of the FHLBs’ debt brings also the exposure of the federal 
government to the potential losses that may arise from risk-taking by the FHLBs that elude their 
regulator.  The conservatorships of and Treasury contributions to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
show that this is more than a theoretical possibility.  The expansion of the System’s “mission” to 
encompass somewhat related activities – as exemplified by the SLOC experience discussed above 
and by the System’s expansion to community development lending more generally – raises the 
efficiency and risk issues in yet more dimensions. 
  The possibilities for the FHLB System in the post-crisis world, with a return to a structure of 
                                                           
     
32 See U.S. Treasury (2009).  
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reasonably well functioning housing finance markets, seem to us to be as follows:
33
  a) Maintain the status quo.  This would, of course, mean the continuation of the risks and 
tensions that accompany the status quo. 
 
  b) Privatize the System.  To the extent that the System plays a worthwhile role as  a 
wholesale lender to smaller financial institutions, this can be continued under a purely private 
charter – perhaps with the private entity keeping its cooperative membership structure. 
  c) Socialize the System.  Bring the System wholly within the boundaries of the U.S. 
Government, perhaps placing it within the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD). 
  d) Combine aspects of b) and c):  Privatize the normal lending function; expand the 
membership of the regional Federal Reserve banks to include the thrifts and insurance companies 
that are currently the members of the FHLB System and thus wrap the System’s provision of 
liquidity to these financial institutions at times of stress explicitly into the functions of the Federal 
Reserve.   
  e) Combine all three GSEs into a cooperatively owned GSE structure:  As we noted earlier, 
a co-op structure for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac has been suggested and discussed, and their 
combination with the FHLB System would achieve just such an ownership structure; but many of 
the risks and the tensions related to the GSE structure would persist. 
  Perhaps creative students of public policy can devise yet more options.  We urge careful 
consideration of all of them. 
    
  IV. Conclusion 
  The FHLB System is the least well known of the three housing GSEs, but its size and 
functions make it worthy of greater attention and understanding.  The issue of the System's 
                                                           
     
33 Similar options would seem to apply to the other housing GSEs.  
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capabilities for offering SLOCs on tax-exempt municipal bonds was discussed in this chapter as an 
illustration of a number of important questions concerning the System and its activities.  The FHLB 
System's history, current structure, activities, incentives, and regulation all warrant further study, 
along with its appropriate role in the post-crisis landscape of the U.S. financial system.  
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 Table 1 
The 12 FHLBs: Assets, Members, and Concentration of Ownership and Advances  
December 31, 2008 
 




Membership Concentration                      
(Five Largest Members)  
  $ Billion    Share of Capital  Share of Advances 
Atlanta  $208.6  1,238  43.9%  51.3% 
Boston  $80.4  461  51.5%  53.6% 
Chicago  $92.1  816  29.9%  39.9% 
Cincinnati  $98.2  728  51.4%  59.6% 
Dallas  $78.9  923  51.1%  59.2% 
Des Moines  $68.1  1,245  40.1%  40.1% 
Indianapolis  $56.9  424  45.4%  48.4% 
New York  $137.5  311  47.8%  50.4% 
Pittsburgh  $90.8  323  57.8%  63.1% 
San 
Francisco 
$321.2  430  72.2%  77.8% 
Seattle  $58.4  381  58.4%  68.4% 
Topeka  $58.6  872  39.2%  49.9% 
         
Combining 
Adjustment 
($0.6)       





a Weighted average: assets as weights 
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Table 2 
Consolidated Balance Sheet of the FHLB System 
December 31, 2008 
 
  Amount 
($ Billions) 
Share of Assets 
(%) 
Assets     
     Advances  $928.6  68.8 
     Mortgage Loans (Net)  $87.4  6.5 
     Mortgage-backed Securities  $169.2  12.5 
     Cash & Non-Mortgage Investments  $157.5  11.7 
     Other Assets  $6.4  0.5 
          Total Assets  $1,349.1  100.0 
      
Liabilities and Capital:     
     Consolidated Obligations (Net)  $1,258.3  93.3 
     Other Liabilities  $39.4  2.9 
     Membership Capital Stock  $49.6  3.7 
     Retained Earnings  $2.9  0.2 
     Other Comprehensive Income  ($1.1)  (0.1) 
          Total Liabilities and Capital  $1,349.1  100.0 
 
Source: Federal Home Loan Banks’ Office of Finance  
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Table 3 













Advances as a 




         
1935     $0.2*    $0.1  50.0%  3,467 
1940         0.3      0.2  66.7  3,864 
1945         0.3      0.2  66.7  3,697 
1950            -      0.8                       -  3,930 
1955         2.2      1.4  63.6  4,336 
1960         3.3      2.0  60.6  4,716 
1965         7.8      6.0  76.9  5,053 
1970       14.7    10.6  72.1  4,649 
1975       22.7    17.8  78.4  4,274 
1980       54.3    49.0  90.2  4,244 
1985     112.2    88.9  79.2  3,489 
1990     165.7  117.1  70.7    3,000* 
1995     272.7  132.2  48.5  5,575 
2000     653.7  437.9  67.0  7,777 
2005     997.4  619.9  62.2  8,149 
2006  1,016.5  640.7  63.0    8,127 
2007  1,271.8  875.1  68.8  8,075 




Sources: FHFA, FHFB; FHLBs, FHLBB 
 